A preprint submitted to arXiv on 9 November 2026 says that a gatekeeper cannot use finite, machine-checkable evidence to completely classify every program written by an AI assistant against certain behavioral rules. Author Tomas Perez-Acle considers a gatekeeper that decides from code alone whether a program may run.[1]
The abstract considers three requirements: never taking a forbidden action, never letting output depend on a secret, and eventually answering. It says that for forbidden actions, an execution can reveal a violation, but finite observation cannot clear a safe program forever. For confidentiality and eventual response, the abstract says neither compliance nor noncompliance can always be established through the stipulated finite evidence.[1]
The author also says a time limit makes the problem checkable, but can require running a program for essentially the entire limit. The abstract describes a narrower alternative: a checkable list containing everything the gatekeeper must allow and nothing it must refuse. It reports simulations on random programs and self-referential adversaries, but the saved abstract does not provide enough detail to assess their design or results independently.[1]
Lead photo: Tomas Perez-Acle · CC BY 4.0.
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