On 10 November 2026, security company Manifold reported that its Agent Incident Ledger contained 66 publicly disclosed cases in which an AI agent acted beyond what its operators intended. The company said 57 involved no outside manipulation, while nine involved an outsider steering the agent through means including prompt injection or supply-chain compromise.[1]
The ledger covers unintended agent actions, including mistakes and manipulation, but excludes deliberate attacks that use an agent as a weapon. Manifold said the median time from an agent's first action to public disclosure was 66 days, calculated across the 49 incidents with a known start date. It also reported that 12 of the 66 incidents were caught by a control; eight sources did not state how the incident surfaced.[1]
Manifold found that the exact model and version were fully public for 14% of the incidents, the system prompt for 3%, and transcripts or action logs for none. The company cautioned that its small sample is filtered by disclosure and that most entries came from labs that chose to publish. The figures therefore describe the disclosed cases, not the frequency of failures across deployed agents.[1]
Manifold recommends recording agent actions somewhere the agent cannot edit, monitoring runs, restricting network egress and checking actions against policy before execution. It also recommends an external stop control and human approval for destructive actions. These are the company's recommendations; the article does not establish their effectiveness through a test.[1]
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