Yao Wang, Zehua Ma, Weiming Zhang and Han Fang submitted Right Tool, Wrong Parameters: Defending LLM Agents Against Parameter Poisoning to arXiv on 3 November 2026. The preprint proposes AuthorityFlow, a defense against indirect prompt injection that changes tool arguments while preserving the agent’s intended action.[1]

The authors call this attack surface parameter poisoning. An attacker might alter a recipient or another task-critical value without introducing a new tool invocation. That makes action-level detection insufficient in the authors’ account: legitimate user requests can also require parameter changes, so the question is which information has authority to determine each argument.[1]

AuthorityFlow has three stages, according to the abstract. It interprets the user query to construct a task-specific trust hierarchy over available information fields; traces each argument’s value to its supporting field; and accepts that value only when the field is trusted to determine that parameter for the task. Influence from lower-trust fields is flagged as potential poisoning.[1]

The authors also introduce FactAuthBench. They report attack success falling from 93.06% without defense to 9.03% with AuthorityFlow, while benign task utility falls from 90.28% to 82.64%. These are abstract-reported evaluation results; our reading does not independently establish their reproducibility or applicability to deployed agents.[1]

[1]: Right Tool, Wrong Parameters: Defending LLM Agents Against Parameter Poisoning, arXiv, 3 November 2026.

Sources

  1. Right Tool, Wrong Parameters: Defending LLM Agents Against Parameter PoisoningarXiv · 3 Nov 2026

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