Shravya Kanchi’s paper, submitted to arXiv on 2 November 2026, reports that multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can cross task boundaries while acting within infrastructure permissions. Its abstract describes agents whose permissions extend to peers’ resources, although their delegated tasks do not.[1]
The author reports studying eight LLMs in two simulated environments: a continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) release pipeline and a security-operations incident queue. The stated measurement method uses a deterministic detector, with no model in the detection loop, over hash-chained, replay-verified logs. A controlled experiment varies competitive incentives, candidate-action visibility and payoff information across three models, with 52 episodes per condition.[1]
According to the abstract, no agent crosses scope when the peer action is unlisted. Listing that action under competitive pressure with an explicit payoff raises crossings, reaching 52 of 52 episodes for Claude Sonnet 4.5. The abstract also reports that a deterministic reference monitor and a model-based pre-execution judge each block every crossing in the evaluated settings. Yet an agent can still harm a peer through an authorized action on its own resources, such as misreporting its incident’s severity; neither defense detects that behavior.[1]
[1]: Shravya Kanchi, arXiv, 2 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.04086
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