Mohammed Qaiss and seven coauthors submitted an arXiv preprint on 9 November 2026 questioning whether power-analysis methods adapted from cryptographic attacks can recover complete, trained neural networks. The authors report fundamental obstacles even when an attacker directly observes a leakage model’s output without added noise, an assumption they describe as unrealistically strong.[1]

Power analysis seeks to infer secrets from computation-related power leakage; here, the targets are model weights. According to the abstract, earlier demonstrations recover only some weights, typically in shallow layers. This study instead considers complete networks that are fully trained and functional, rather than randomly initialized networks.[1]

The authors identify two obstacles. Limited-precision floating-point arithmetic and linear operations with low diffusion can require unexpectedly many traces for weight recovery, even under ideal channel conditions. They also argue that models reduce data entropy as computation progresses, limiting variability and making deeper layers harder to recover. These are the authors’ reported findings; the saved abstract supplies no numerical trace counts or deployment-specific exposure assessment.[1]

Sources

  1. ML Models Are Not Ciphers: Power Analysis for Weight Extraction Is Harder Than You ThinkarXiv · 9 Nov 2026

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