An Agent Router security advisory published on 6 November 2026 reports that reusing a Model Context Protocol (MCP) session across routes can bypass per-tool JSON Web Token (JWT) authorization under a specific mixed-authentication configuration. Advisory GHSA-72hp-5vm2-frr7 lists 1.2.0 as affected and 1.2.1 as patched, with Moderate severity and a CVSS 3.1 score of 6.8.[1]
The configuration involves two routes sharing one Gateway proxy: route A uses OAuth and a per-tool JWT rule; route B does not validate the bearer token or set the session-subject header. According to the advisory, session resumption restores route A from the session ID without comparing it with the current request route. Route A's authorization code then parses the current token without verifying its signature, allowing forged scope claims to satisfy its tool rule.[1]
The caller still needs a valid low-scope account to establish a route-A session, access to route B, and the retained session ID and subject. Backend and tool selectors remain effective. The advisory says this does not bypass initial OAuth login or grant cluster-admin privileges; consequences depend on the tools and data exposed.[1]
[1]: https://github.com/theagentrouter/agent-router/security/advisories/ghsa-72hp-5vm2-frr7
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