On 12 November 2026, a security advisory published in the Model Context Protocol Inspector repository reported an authorization bypass affecting the Windows daemon communication path. The advisory lists npm package @modelcontextprotocol/inspector versions 2.10.0 through 2.14.0 as affected and version 2.15.0 as patched.[1]

The advisory says the Windows branch of getDaemonSocketPath derives a named pipe from a hash of the resolved, lowercased daemon directory path. It describes that pipe name as predictable and says a local attacker could create the pipe first, impersonate the daemon and capture a bearer token sent by clients. It also says the Windows implementation of assertTrustedPrivateRoot returns without validating ownership or access controls.[1]

The advisory proposes generating a random pipe name, publishing it in the token file, validating the daemon directory’s Windows access controls and owner, rejecting certain pre-existing pipe instances, and authenticating the daemon before clients send the token. Its page rates the issue Moderate with a CVSS score of 5.0, while the advisory description itself calls the severity HIGH. The saved source does not resolve that difference.[1]

Sources

  1. [paths.ts] CWE-863 Authorization Bypassgithub.com · 12 Nov 2026

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